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1. The Rise of Mobile Studies
This introductory section of my present paper is a kind of report on the 
ongoing social science research programme I am directing: the project 
“Communications in the 21st Century”, launched in January 2001, conduct-
ed jointly by T-Mobile Hungary (until 2004 Westel Mobile) and the Hun-
garian Academy of Sciences. In the framework of the project a number of 
international conferences were held, on the basis of which altogether eleven 
volumes—four Hungarian, one German, and six English—have been pub-
lished. I will ﬁrst give a very brief summary of these volumes, and then pro-
vide a more detailed description of some of the main results we arrived at.
The eleven volumes are witness to the history of the mobile phone 
between 2001 and 2007, no doubt the most dynamic aspect of the recent 
history of technological and social transformation. But most of all they 
amount to a ﬁrst laying of the foundations for, and at the same time the awak-
ening to consciousness and self-reﬂection of, a young discipline: the social 
science of mobile communication. Initially, research on problems pertaining 
to the mobile arose as an interdisciplinary task. From the interdisciplinary 
research, each of the participating disciplines proﬁted, being forced to take 
account, on the level of theory, of the new medium which by now has come 
to constitute their main communicational environment. As a consequence 
of this taking account of the new realities, by 2005 a transformation was 
occurring which today has clearly become irreversible: the internal adapta-
tion of the social sciences to the world of mobile communications. At the 
same time, an autonomous line of research emerged, based on a set of well-
established paradigms of its own: the social science of mobile communi-
cation, Mobile Studies. Both aspects of this juncture in the history of science 
are represented in Nyíri (2007a, 2007b), which on the one hand takes stock 
of the paradigmatic results of mobile studies, and on the other hand high-
lights some new perspectives of the social sciences becoming aware of their 
mobile environment.
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Our ﬁrst two Hungarian collections (Nyíri 2001a, 2001b) on the one hand 
gave an initial inventory of the pertinent research problems and conceptual 
resources, and on the other hand, by way of drawing, as it were, a sketch of 
the mobile horizons of the future, formulated the following theses/hypoth-
eses: 1. Mobile communication and physical mobility mutually reinforce 
each other—the internet and mobile telephony ultimately result in more, 
not less, travel and personal encounters. 2. Since knowledge is information 
embedded in context, and mobile communication is markedly situation-de-
pendent and thus context-creating, the mobile information society is likely 
to be a society of knowledge, not of mere information. 3. Mobile, interac-
tive, multimedia communication amounts to a return, on a higher level, to 
primordial, less-alienated forms of communication. 4. Mobile communica-
tion induces changes in human cognitive faculties. 5. The nature of political 
communication becomes transformed. 6. The nature of scientiﬁc communi-
cation becomes transformed.
The third Hungarian-language collection (Nyíri 2002b) appeared as an 
enlarged variant of the parallel German and English volumes (Nyíri 2002a, 
2003a). This collection discussed in depth the notion of the information so-
ciety as a knowledge community; among its chapters were Robin Dunbar’s 
essay on gossip as a mechanism for maintaining community cohesion, and a 
deﬁnitive study on m-politics by Miklós Sükösd and Endre Dányi.2
Of the ﬁve other English-language volumes following upon (Nyíri 2003a), 
in the same year a further two appeared: (Nyíri 2003b), which played a pio-
neering role in the social scientiﬁc exposition of the notion of “m-learning”, 
a notion that today is very much in the centre of educational theory; and 
(Nyíri 2003c), presenting the mobile phone as the very answer to the com-
municational challenges of a decentralized global mass society. In the col-
lection (Nyíri 2005) we strove to demonstrate that the mobile phone is not 
just an instrument for enabling global contacts, but also a means to maintain 
local bonds, organizing the life of small regions and small territories. (Nyíri 
2006a) once more turned to the issue of m-learning, this time on a markedly 
philosophical level. It told of the revolution in epistemology, in particular 
about the revolution in educational theory; of our mobile companion as part 
of our mind; of the return of collective thinking; and of the development 
of the world of non-formal learning. To (Nyíri 2007a) I have referred to 
above.
Besides the literature mentioned in note 1 above, I would here like to 
single out four further excellent monographs on the topic of mobile commu-
nication: Ling (2004), from which I received a major impetus for my Kirch-
berg paper (Nyíri 2006b); Levinson (2004); Goggin (2006); and, last but not 
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least, Castells et al. (2007). Between 1996 and 1998, Manuel Castells pub-
lished his famous trilogy The Information Age (to which I will have occasion 
to come back presently) taking some 1400 pages to reach the conclusion that 
information and communication technologies were deepening, rather than 
closing, the gap between the rich and the poor. As he would characteristi-
cally put it in his unfathomable left-wing idiom: ICTs were instrumental in 
supplanting the “space of places” by a “space of ﬂows”. In 1999, I put a vi-
cious review of the work onto the web.3 In the following years I have come 
to regret the viciousness, but certainly not the critical stance, of the review. 
And it is with great satisfaction I note that, under the impact of the rise of the 
mobile phone, Castells himself has by today quite dramatically shifted his 
position. Castells et al. (2007), actually published in November 2006, fully 
recognizes the liberating effects of today’s dominant ICT, namely mobile 
telephony.
2. Knowledge Societies or Knowledge Communities?
2. 1. The Notion of a Knowledge Society
The new information and communication technologies herald the prom-
ise, and indeed have to a signiﬁcant measure already brought about, changes 
which can be meaningfully discussed under the heading of knowledge so-
cieties. However, the term “knowledge societies” by now seems to have 
acquired two distinct, albeit related, meanings. In its ﬁrst meaning it refers 
to the trend classically analyzed by Bell (1973). Bell’s central term is “post-
industrial society”, but he also uses the terms “knowledgeable society” (Bell 
1973, 263) and „knowledge society”. The term “knowledge society” ﬁrst 
occurs on p. 212 of the book. As Bell here writes: 
Technology is one axis of the post-industrial society; the other axis is knowledge as a 
fundamental resource. Knowledge and technology are embodied in social institutions 
and represented by persons. In short, we can talk of a knowledge society. … The post-
industrial society, it is clear, is a knowledge society in a double sense: ﬁrst, the sources 
of innovation are increasingly derivative from research and development (and more 
directly, there is a new relation between science and technology because of the central-
ity of theoretical knowledge); second, the weight of the society—measured by a larger 
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proportion of Gross National Product and a larger share of employment—is increasingly 
in the knowledge ﬁeld.
In a post-industrial society, knowledge and technology have become the 
central resources of society and economy. Perhaps it is the today oft-used 
circumlocution “knowledge-based society” that best expresses this state of 
affairs; and perhaps it is useful to stress, as especially Castells does, that what 
characterizes this society “is not the centrality of knowledge and informa-
tion, but the application of such knowledge and information to knowledge 
generation and information processing/communication devices, in a cumula-
tive feedback loop between innovation and the uses of innovation” (Castells 
1996, 32). To be sure, the expressions “knowledge society” or “knowledge-
based society” are not ones Castells would use. His preferred terms are, on 
the one hand, the well-worn “information society”, and, on the other, “infor-
mational society”—the latter a phrase of his own coinage. I have indicated 
above that the term “information society” is misleading—confounding, as 
it were, information and knowledge; while Castells’ tormented neologism 
“informational society” is unhelpful at best. The term ﬁrst occurs in Cas-
tells’ early book The City and the Grassroots (Castells 1983). It is here that 
he introduces, in the course of a rather hair-splitting elucidation, the con-
cept “informational mode of development”. Modes of development, Cas-
tells stresses in the wake of Touraine, must be carefully distinguished from 
modes of production; the concept of a mode of development “refers to the 
particular form in which labour, matter, and energy are combined in work to 
obtain the product. Work is certainly related to social (class) relationships, 
but, in addition to the way through which the surplus is appropriated, it is 
also important to understand how the surplus is increased.” There are two 
types of mode of development, Castells here points out, the industrial and 
the informational, and then goes on to give a slightly confused explanation: 
“For the informational mode of production, productivity is based on knowl-
edge... Informationalism is orientated towards technological development, 
that is, towards the accumulation of knowledge” (Castells 1983, 307). In his 
deservedly famous The Informational City—the book in which Castells, for 
the ﬁrst and the last time, can actually bring himself to believe that the new 
information technologies might have a politically liberating potential—there 
occurs the felicitous formulation “what is speciﬁc to the informational mode 
of development is that here knowledge intervenes upon knowledge itself to 
generate higher productivity” (Castells 1989, 10), only to give way, in The 
Information Age, again, to a rather less transparent “analytical distinction” 
between 
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the notions of “information society” and “informational society”, with similar implica-
tions for information/informational economy. The term information society emphasizes 
the role of information in society. But … information, in its broadest sense, e.g. as com-
munication of knowledge, has been critical in all societies, including medieval Europe 
which was culturally structured, and to some extent uniﬁed, around scholasticism, that 
is, by and large an intellectual framework... In contrast, the term informational indicates 
the attribute of a speciﬁc form of social organization in which information generation, 
processing, and transmission become the fundamental sources of productivity and pow-
er, because of new technological conditions emerging in this historical period (Castells 
1996, 21). 
To my review of Castells’ work I have referred above, in section 1.
In its second meaning the term “knowledge society” is connected with the 
idea of universal access to knowledge, emphasizing that while such access is 
becoming increasingly attainable today, it was never a possibility in earlier 
ages. In a trivial sense, all societies are knowledge-based; however, much of 
the knowledge both in traditional societies and all through modernity was 
possessed by a minority, and much of that knowledge was not knowledge at 
all, but rather myth, superstition, lethal error or, at best, spurious learning. It 
does a disservice to progress to deny that we are today in fact witnessing a 
historical turning-point, and that past societies were ignorance-based socie-
ties rather than knowledge-based societies. 
2. 2. Information and Knowledge 
Echoing T. S. Eliot’s famous lines from the early 1930s—“Where is the 
wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost 
in information?”—John Naisbitt in his popular book Megatrends (Naisbitt 
1982) bemoans the phenomenon that the world is “drowning in information, 
but is starved for knowledge”. Naisbitt’s formulation is taken up by Vartan 
Gregorian among many others, in an address given in 1992.4 Gregorian—at 
that time President of Brown University—there also refers to Carlos Fuentes 
as saying that “one of the greatest challenges facing modern society and 
contemporary civilization is how to transform information into knowledge”. 
The conclusion Gregorian reaches is that today’s educational institutions 
must be careful to “provide not just information, but its distillation, namely 
knowledge”. 
The notion that “information” is somehow inferior to “knowledge” is not 
of recent origin. Although the Latin word informare, meaning the action of 
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forming matter, such as stone, wood, leather, etc., also took on the senses “to 
instruct”, “to educate”, “to form an idea”5—Cicero’s informare deos coniec-
tura was explained as “imaginer en son esprit et conjecturer quels sont les 
dieux” by Robert Estienne in his Dictionarium Latinogallicum (1552)—“in-
formare” in Italian, “informer” in French, and “to inform” in English from 
the beginning had the connotation of conveying knowledge that is merely 
particular. Perhaps another Latin word, informis—meaning unshapen, form-
less—had, with its French and English derivatives (“informe”, “inform”), a 
certain coincidental effect here. To have information amounted to knowing 
details, possibly unconnected. Hence the use of the word “information” in 
the contexts of criminal accusation, charge, legal process. John Locke, in 
his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), might have thought 
that “information” had to do with “truth and real knowledge”;6 however, 
what the OED refers to as the “prevailing mod. sense” of inform, namely “to 
impart knowledge of some particular fact or occurrence”, or the Larousse 
phrase “informer quel-qu’un de quelque chose”, indeed appear to capture 
the essentials of the concept.
Thus Roszak (1986) can correctly point out that in the days of his child-
hood, shortly before the outbreak of World War II, “information” was a dull 
word, referring to answers to concrete questions, having the form of names, 
numbers, dates, etc. With Shannon’s and Weaver’s technical concept of in-
formation, put forward in Shannon and Weaver (1949), and with the emer-
gence of computers, it also became a misleading—and glorious—word. 
Attempts at clariﬁcation of course abound. Daniel Bell made such an at-
tempt. As he wrote: “By information I mean data processing in the broad-
est sense; the storage, retrieval, and processing of data becomes the essen-
tial resource for all economic and social exchanges. ... By knowledge, I 
mean an organized set of statements of facts or ideas, presenting a reasoned 
judgment or an experimental result, which is transmitted to others through 
some communication medium in some systematic form” (Bell 1979, 168). 
Slightly less straightforward from the point of view of the present argument 
is Dretske’s formula: “Roughly speaking, information is that commodity 
capable of yielding knowledge, and what information a signal carries is what 
we can learn from it” (Dretske 1981, 44).
Let me sum up the foregoing by saying that knowledge can be usefully 
regarded as information in context. Now it is a standard observation that 
information sought through mobile phones is, characteristically, location-
speciﬁc and situation-speciﬁc. It seems, then, that mobile communication 
tends to engender not just information, but information in context: that is, 
knowledge per se.
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2. 3. Communication and Community
The early phase of the research project “Communications in the 
21st  Century” went under the title „The Mobile Information Society”, a 
phrase that has been current since 1999 or so. However, we have increasing-
ly come to realize that it is a misleading phrase. For mobile communications 
point to a future which offers a wealth of knowledge, not just of information, 
and promise to re-establish, within the life of modern society, some of the 
features formerly enjoyed by genuine local communities. „Community” on 
the one hand, „society” on the other, clearly differ in their connotations; and 
it was Tönnies who, towards the end of the nineteenth century, crystallized 
this difference into a conceptual contrast. As Tönnies sees it, community 
involves “real”, “organic”, continuous associations. While the members of 
societies “are essentially separated in spite of all connecting factors”, the 
members of a community “remain essentially connected in spite of all sepa-
rating factors”. As Tönnies of course states, “community is old, society is 
new, as a phenomenon and as a name”;7 however, the striking observation in 
the recent literature on mobile telephony is that through constant communi-
cative connectedness a kind of turning back to the living, personal interac-
tions of earlier communities is brought about. Certainly this is the message 
of the formula “perpetual contact” in Katz and Aakhus (2002). The “so-
cio-logic”, indeed the “ontologies”, of perpetual contact receive here (Katz 
and Aakhus 2002, 305–309)—not without a sidelong glance, incidentally, 
at Heidegger—an especially profound analysis in the closing essay by Katz 
and Aakhus, “Conclusion: Making Meaning of Mobiles—a Theory of Ap-
paratgeist”. Writing about ﬁxed-line telephone networks Claude S. Fischer 
had already in the early 1990s marshalled arguments against the view that 
“the telephone is yet another of modernity’s blows against local Gemein-
schaft, the close community” (Fischer 1994, 25).
Adhering to a fundamental idea of the German Romantic philosophy of 
language, Tönnies propounded the view that it is not individual conscious-
ness, but rather communication within the commmunity, that is the agent 
of human thinking. “Mental life”, writes Tönnies, “manifests itself through 
communication, that is through the effect on kindred beings through signs, 
especially words pronounced by the use of vocal organs. From this develops 
thinking, i.e., the communication to oneself through audible or inaudible 
speech” (Tönnies 1957, 107). In the introductory chapter “The Theory of 
Community” Tönnies emphasizes that language, which “by means of ges-
tures and sounds, enables expressions”, is not “a means and tool by which 
one makes oneself understood”, but it is “itself the living understanding” 
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(Tönnies 1957, 47). The same idea of course plays a major role also in Hei-
degger’s views, for whom “understanding” and “being together” (Mitsein) 
are intrinsically related to each other. As he puts it in the famous § 34 of Be-
ing and Time, making assertions or giving information is just a special case 
of “communication”. In its most general sense, communication is the rela-
tionship in which “being with one another is understandingly constituted”; 
“communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences ... from 
the interior of one subject into the interior of another” (Heidegger 1962, 
205).
John Dewey already in 1915 formulated the thesis that social life is not 
just maintained by communication, but indeed constituted by it. As his oft-
quoted lines run:
Society not only continues to exist by transmission, by communication, but it may fairly 
be said to exist in transmission, in communication. There is more than a verbal tie be-
tween the words common, community, and communication. Men live in a community in 
virtue of the things they have in common; and communication is the way in which they 
come to possess things in common (Dewey 1915, 4).
Dewey’s thesis is corroborated by contemporary research in evolutionary 
psychology. Robin Dunbar in his essay referred to above, in (Nyíri 2003a), 
propounds the view that language emerged in order to ensure social cohesion 
within primate groups at a stage where pre-verbal means of mutual attention 
had ceased to be effective due to growing group size. Language creates so-
cial cohesion and group identity; linguistic differences serve the isolating of 
groups from each other. With the increasing inﬂuence of literacy however 
there arises a functional disorder: written language appears as the “correct” 
one in contrast to the merely spoken dialects (Sándor 2003). The new tech-
nologies of communication—the rise of secondary orality,8 especially in the 
form of mobile telephony—now promise to heal that disorder.
Even the most cursory survey of the topic of communication and com-
munity would be one-sided without a reference to Deutsch (1953), a book it 
is imperative for contemporary philosophical research on communication to 
rediscover. Like Tönnies, Deutsch postulates a conceptual contrast between 
community and society, but in his case the dimension of communication 
plays a rather more explicit role than it did in Tönnies’ work. Deutsch ap-
plies the notion of complementarity, originally a concept in communica-
tions theory, to the issues of social communication, and deﬁnes communities 
as characterized by patterns of communication that display a high level of 
complementarity between information conveyed through various channels 
157
(Deutsch 1953, 69 ff.). It is because of the drive to multimedia inherent in 
networked and mobile communication, and indeed because of the recent, 
quite overwhelming trend of telecommunications convergence—the amal-
gamation of the ﬁxed-line phone, mobile telephony, internet access, and en-
tertainment (IPTV)—that the approach of Deutsch today again appears as 
especially timely. 
3. The Network Individual
In the age of telecommunications convergence, it appears to be warranted 
to speak of a new type of personality: the “network individual”. The network 
individual is the person reintegrated, after centuries of relative isolation 
induced by the printing press, into the collective thinking of society—the 
individual whose mind is manifestly mediated, once again, by the minds of 
those forming his/her smaller or larger community.9 This mediation is indeed 
manifest: its patterns can be directly read off the displays of our electronic 
communications devices, of which the mobile phone has clearly become 
the central and most important. Also, there is a theoretical framework at 
our disposal in which those patterns can be conveniently classiﬁed and 
interpreted: Robin Dunbar’s theory of the social brain. 
According to this theory,10 language came about primarily as a tool of 
social intelligence. People mostly converse about others and about each 
other, gossip is a cohesive force. Dunbar established a co-variation between 
on the one hand the neocortex volume of primates, and on the other, various 
aspects of primate social behaviour, including social group size. If a primate 
species embarks on a path to living in a larger group so as to be able to more 
effectively solve its ecological problems, it has to develop a sufﬁciently 
large neocortex to provide capacities for the social information processing 
needed. Calculations show that with a neocortex of the size humans possess, 
we should live in groups of about 150. And this in fact seems to be the case. 
“Although humans”, writes Dunbar, 
can obviously cope with very large urban environments and even nation-states, the 
number of people within those large population units with whom one can say that one 
has a direct personal relationship is very much smaller. Censuses of the population units 
of hunter-gatherers, the size of scientiﬁc sub-disciplines, the number of people to whom 
one sends Christmas cards and the number of people of whom one can ask a favour all 
turn out to be about 150 in number (Dunbar 2003, 58). 
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Within this circle of 150 persons there is a series of smaller circles of in-
dividuals with whom we can maintain a relationship of a given degree of 
intensity. There is ample evidence to the effect that the number of persons 
we can have a particularly close connection with is limited to around 12–15, 
and that there is an inner circle of about 5 persons with whom this relation-
ship is especially strong. We have, in addition, grounds to believe that there 
may be a series of layers, with upper boundaries at around 35 and 80–100, 
each associated with a declining level of emotional closeness. Each of us as 
it were sits in the centre of a series of expanding circles of 5, 15, 35, 80 and 
150 persons (Dunbar 2003, 59).
Let us now cast a glance upon our mobile phone. There are hundreds of 
telephone numbers stored (as well as, to say it parenthetically, thousands of 
e-mail addresses in our mailbox). The number of persons with whom in the 
course of time we have had SMS contacts, is again several hundreds—since 
quite often we have to send SMS messages even to strangers. Recall the 
formula, dismissive but not at all unusual, on the mobile answering device: 
“Please do not leave a message at this number. Send an SMS, or write an 
e-mail.” However, we conduct regular SMS communication with a limited 
number of persons only—the ﬁgure is certainly below 35, and with most 
people even below 15. Finally, MMS messages will not be exchanged beyond 
one’s circle of the most intimate friends—on the average with 5 persons at 
the utmost. As Döring et al. (2006, 198) put it: “The average number of 
people a person exchanges MMS messages with is estimated to be 2 to 5, 
usually including his or her partner and close friends. This at the same time 
implies that MMS messages require the communication partners to share 
a high degree of contextual knowledge and are often incomprehensible to 
outsiders.”11
With the rise of Skype we have yet more access to a rich source of 
experiental data. How many people ﬁgure on one’s “Skype Contacts” list? 
According to my informal survey, the list seldom contains more than 35 
Skype-names—that is, the number of persons with whom we occasionally 
talk over the internet does not exceed the third Dunbarian circle. I have 
chosen the word “occasionally”, since my impression is that the number of 
persons whom we regularly call using VoIP is nearer to 5 than to 15. And 
the number 15 seems to indicate the approximate upper limit of the circle 
of persons with whom we maintain chat contact. I myself ﬁnd it frustrat-
ing if my Skype contacts list refers to more than 15 persons, and again and 
again delete the Skype names of those to whom I do not have a really close 
relationship. This is, after all, a list I have continuously before my eyes, and 
it shows intimate details. I learn who is online when, who has not touched 
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the computer for more than 5 minutes (“Away”), has deserted it for more 
than 20 Minutes (“Not Available”) and who is online, but does not wish to be 
contacted (“Do Not Disturb”). Also, I see faces. Chat in its newer versions 
appears to be restricted, quite unequivocally, to the two innermost Dun- 
barian circles.
My list of approximately 15 persons of course contains names, too, which 
do not ﬁgure on the lists of my intimate chat partners—each of us inhabits 
the centre of different concentric circles. The friends of my friends are not 
necessarily my friends—and it is important that through my friends I should 
also be able to reach, when the need arises, strangers. We have arrived at 
Stanley Milgram’s famous small-world phenomenon (Milgram 1967), also 
known as the „six degrees of separation” pattern. In a way, I ﬁnd it astonish-
ing that Dunbar nowhere refers to Milgram, and indeed that research does 
practically not connect the two names with one another. For there is a rather 
obvious point where the results of the two meet: Milgram’s circle of acquaint-
ances known on a  ﬁrst-name basis is identical with the Dunbarian circle of 
150. And we might assume that should the number of individuals one has a 
personal connection with overstep the limit of 150—a development Dunbar 
holds impossible for cognitive reasons—the Milgram ﬁgure would in its 
turn decrease. Now the latter today is actually the case: a repeated experi-
ment has yielded the number 4.6. As The Economist recently wrote: „Being 
able to keep in touch with a much wider range of people through technolo-
gies such as e-mail has brought everyone closer” (The Economist 2006, 4). 
Perhaps Dunbar does, after all, underestimate the effect of those most re-
cent communications technologies upon our cognitive capacities. And with 
the ongoing convergence of telecommunications technologies, that effect is 
likely to become even more pronounced. In the global knowledge commu-




1 For some ﬁrst responses to this challenge see Roesler (2000), and the outstanding 
volume Katz and Aakhus (2002); further Katz (1999), Kopomaa (2000), Brown, 
Green and Harper (2002). Rheingold (2002) is a useful compilation of quotes and 
interviews.
2 Our Hungarian-language volumes are fully accessible, the German-language and Eng-
lish-language volumes partially accessible, via the www.socialscience.t-mobile.hu
 webpage.
3 See http://www.hunﬁ.hu/nyiri/castells_rev.htm. Printed as (Nyíri 2004).
4 See http://www.cni.org/docs/tsh/Keynote.html.
5 Recall, also, the original meaning of the Greek words eidos or idea: “pattern”, “visual
 form”.
6 Cf. book 3, chapter 10, sect. 34.
7 Compare Tönnies (1957, 33 ff. and 65). I had to modify the English translation at a 
number of points.
8 The term “secondary orality” was coined by Walter J. Ong. As he put it: “with tele-
phone, radio, television and various kinds of sound tape, electronic technology has 
brought us into the age of ‘secondary orality’. This new orality has striking resem-
blances to the old in its participatory mystique, its fostering of a communal sense, 
its concentration on the present moment... But it is essentially a more deliberate and 
self-conscious orality, based permanently on the use of writing and print, which are 
essential for the manufacture and operation of the equipment and for its use as well. 
... secondary orality generates a sense for groups immeasurably larger than those of 
primary oral culture” (Ong 1982, 136).
9 I have begun using the term “network individual”, for designating what I think is a new 
psychological type—and in a sense also the return to a primordial type of personality 
—in the early stages of the project “Communications in the 21st Century” (cf. 
http://www.socialscience.t-mobile.hu/2001_dec_konf/SUMMARIES.pdf, see also 
my preface in (Nyíri 2003c, 16). The network individual is not the uprooted, free-
ﬂoating being as depicted by Barry Wellman. Wellman uses the term “networked 
individualism”. His description: “People remain connected, but as individuals rather 
than being rooted in the home bases of work unit and household. Individuals switch 
rapidly between their social networks. Each person separately operates his networks 
to obtain information, collaboration, orders, support, sociability, and a sense of 
belonging” (Wellman 2002). 
10 See in particular (Dunbar 1996), as well as his essay in (Nyíri 2003a).
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